We are convened this morning to examine U.S. counter terrorism policy in the wake of the despicable attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

At the outset, let me say that I commend FBI Director Louis Freeh for his outstanding work and that of the entire FBI in responding to the bombings in Africa. The swift and capable work of the FBI, in partnership with other agencies and foreign governments in investigating these crimes and beginning the process of bringing the perpetrators to justice sends an unmistakable message: terrorism will not go unpunished.

I believe that it is long past time for us to demonstrate our resolve in dealing with terrorist elements. I have publicly supported the President’s decision to attack the chemical weapons production facility in Khartoum and the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The President deserves our support in taking those actions. Friends and foes alike must know that the United States stands united in facing down the scourge of international terrorism, and I am committed to providing the resources and tools that are necessary to respond to the threat of terrorism, and when acts of terrorism are committed, to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice.

More than two years after Congress enacted the most comprehensive antiterrorism legislation in our history, however, it is appropriate for us to review whether our national counter terrorism policy is effective. In short, is the Administration effectively using all the tools, including those provided by Congress, to disrupt foreign terrorist organizations, punish those nations supporting terrorists, and cut off funding to these groups? Are these tools effective? Do we need additional legislation to address international terrorism?

I must say that one aspect of the President’s recent antiterrorism policy causes me some concern. On May 22, 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 62, which made numerous adjustments to the roles and functions of various executive branch departments and agencies relative to the prevention and deterrence of terrorist acts, the management of terrorist threats, and the investigation and management of the consequences of a successful terrorist act.

It is my understanding that PDD 62 shifts responsibility for significant functions, including primary responsibility for federal counter-terrorism special event security planning, preparation and implementation, from the FBI to other federal agencies, including the Secret Service. Although it has been suggested that PDD 62 only has each agency doing what it already does best, I believe that there remain questions about this directive. I am a supporter of the Secret Service and an admirer of Director Merletti. But I question whether the reassignment of responsibility for the counter terrorism mission is a wise step to take at this time.

Additionally, I continue to have concerns that, collectively, we are not engaging in the kind of comprehensive, sustained effort against terrorism that is needed. In order to fight this war, we need to have an adequate assessment of the magnitude of the anticipated threat from international terrorism to U.S. interests, persons and property at home and abroad. We need to determine the composition of the major terrorist organizations and their leadership. Additionally, it is crucial that we maximize the development of information relating to their sources of financial and logistical support, the nature and scope of their human and technical infrastructure, the quality and type of their education and training, their level of advancement and their linkages with state and non-state actors such as ethnic groups, purported religious organizations or criminal organizations, and their intent or capabilities to access and use weapons of mass destruction. Without an adequate assessment of the threat, it is impossible to have a functioning strategy to counter that threat.

All of these questions deserve this Committee’s concentrated attention. I want to commend Senator Kyl, the Chairman of the subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, for his focussed and able work on this issue. He organized this hearing and should be commended for his leadership.

We are pleased to have with us three distinguished witnesses. On the first panel is the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh. On the second panel is the former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, and the former Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, both of whom have extensive experience in national security affairs. Mr. Woolsey held key posts during the negotiations of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Nuclear and Space Arms Talks; and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and SALT I. Dr. Kirkpatrick served for more than four years as the United States Representative to the United Nations, as well as a member of the Cabinet and National Security Council of Ronald Reagan, the first woman to serve in that office. She also served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for five years and the Defense Policy Review Board for eight years. Dr. Kirkpatrick has authored numerous books on public policy, and is currently Professor of Government at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

I extend my appreciation to our witnesses, and look forward to their testimony.