TESTIMONY

by

NATHAN J. DIAMENT, Esq.

Director of Public Policy –

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

 

June 6, 2001

United States Senate

Committee on the Judiciary

 

With regard to

 

Faith-Based Solutions;

What are the Legal Issues?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

1640 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20036

TEL: 202-857-2770 FAX: 202-331-9161

 

Introduction

Thank you, Senator Leahy and Senator Hatch, for the opportunity to address this Committee today.  My name is Nathan Diament and I am privileged to serve as the director of public policy for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America.  The UOJCA is a non-partisan organization in its second century of serving the traditional Jewish community, and is the largest Orthodox Jewish umbrella organization in the United States representing nearly 1,000 synagogues and their many members

nationwide.

 

On behalf of the UOJCA, I come before you today to address two legal issues that are relevant to the effort to expand the already existing partnership between government and faith-based social service providers: the first issue is the Constitutional issue raised by the First Amendment’s religion clauses, the second issue relates to religious liberty protections contained in our nation’s civil rights statutes.

 

But before addressing the legal issues, I would like to suggest that we step back for a moment and appreciate the broader context of our conversation today.  Since this nation’s founding, evaluating the role of religion in our society’s public life has been part of our national conversation.  But in recent months, this issue has been re-engaged with new vigor and prominence.  Last year’s nomination of an Orthodox Jew to a national ticket put the discussion back on the front page.  This year’s creation of the White House Office of Faith-Based & Community Initiatives has served as a catalyst for continuing this national discussion.  The fact that we are having this discussion is in itself a wonderful thing for our democratic society.

 

Just as important is the fact that we are having a national discussion about finding new ways to address our social welfare challenges, particularly those confronting lower income populations.  To have President Johnson’s declaration of a war on poverty cited once again in public addresses appreciatively, rather than derisively is a welcome development.[1] 

 

One more word of introduction, I believe is critical.  It is the case that the Bush Administration’s focus on faith-based initiatives has given this policy issue a new degree of attention.  But I respectfully remind you that this is not a new initiative.  It received bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate and was signed into law by President Clinton on four occasions since 1996.[2]  Moreover, it was one of the few public policy initiatives that enjoyed support during the last presidential campaign from both parties’ presidential candidates.

 

In a major address to the Salvation Army, it was candidate Al Gore who stated: “The men and women who work in faith…based organizations are driven by their spiritual commitment…they have sustained the drug addicted, the mentally ill, the homeless; they have trained them, educated them, cared for them…most of all they have done what government can never do…they have loved them.”  Mr. Gore went on to propose what he called a “New Partnership” under which the “charitable choice” concept would be expanded.  He stated: “As long as there is always a secular alternative for anyone who wants one, and as long as no one is required to participate in religious observances as a condition for receiving services, faith-based organizations can provide jobs and job training, counseling and mentoring, food and basic medical care.  They can do so with public funds – and without having to alter the religious character that is so often the key to their effectiveness.”[3]

 

I raise this today not to minimize in the least the commitment of President Bush and his Administration to this effort which is well known, but to remind you that, to date, “charitable choice” initiatives have been bipartisan initiatives – just as they are in Senate Bill 304, which enjoys bipartisan sponsorship in this Committee.[4]  The speeches delivered by Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore that I have appended to my testimony clearly reflect their common commitment to this cause. 

 

The fact that this initiative is now receiving greater attention should not be the cause for baser partisanship.  The faith-based initiative does seem to have become a political Rorschach test, with some interest groups projecting their worst fears upon it.[5]  But the fact that this initiative raises complex and critical questions should give rise to careful and reasoned discussion – as we have engaged in today – rather than overheated fear-mongering.

 

Social Service Grants and the Establishment Clause

America’s synagogues, churches and other faith-based charities already play an important role in addressing many social challenges – through soup kitchens and literacy programs, clothing drives and job skills training, our faith communities remain the “little platoons” of our civilized society.  My organization believes that these institutions can play an even larger and more beneficial role if they are supported in that effort. 

 

We at the UOJCA do not suggest, as some might, that every faith-based social service provider will do a better job than a secular or government agency.  Each of these agencies are programmed and staffed by real people – some will do better than others.  We do not assert that every person in need will best be served by a faith-based provider – some will, some won’t; we’ve long ago realized that “one-size-fits-all” approaches do not work in most contexts – we need H.U.D. and Habitat for Humanity, H.H.S. and the Hebrew Home for the Aged.  Moreover, we do not believe that including faith-based providers in the partnerships that government forms should be an excuse for letting the government shirk its commitment to devote an appropriate level of financial and human resources directly to addressing social needs.[6]  But we do believe that if the government decides not to go it alone, but to invite partners from the private and public interest sectors in tackling social welfare challenges, then the government ought not say to one class of agencies – “you may not be our partner because you are religious.”[7]

 

We submit that the Constitution’s Establishment Clause stands for a simple proposition: that the government may not favor one religion over others, or religion over non-religion.  But it does not stand for the proposition that government must favor the secular over the sacred.  The Establishment Clause, as the Supreme Court has said, demands neutrality toward religion, not hostility.[8] 

 

Neutrality, I submit to you, means that in a grant program, government must be “faith-blind,” if you will.  Government ought to establish grant criteria that have nothing to do with whether prospective grantees are religious or secular, but simply whether they have the capacity to perform the service and obtain the results the government seeks to achieve through the grant.  That is the essence of what the Establishment Clause demands in this context.

 

Support for this neutrality-centered view can be found in many Supreme Court precedents the most recent of which is Mitchell v. Helms, decided just one year ago.[9]  In Helms, six of the nine justices came down squarely on the side of the neutrality view of the Establishment Clause.[10]  The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a federal grant program which allows local education agencies to use federal funds for the purchase of supplementary educational materials, including textbooks and computers, for schools within their jurisdiction.[11]  Because the aid was also made available to parochial schools within the jurisdiction, it was challenged as a violation of the Establishment Clause.[12]  The Court rejected this challenge.

 

Justices Thomas, Rhenquist, Kennedy and Scalia rejected the challenge on the basis of a neutrality-centered understanding of the Establishment Clause without any qualifications.  For these justices, so long as secular government aid is provided to religious institutions on the basis of religion-neutral criteria it does not violate the Establishment Clause, and the constitutionality of currently enacted and pending charitable choice laws is unquestionable.

 

Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, also invoked the principle of neutrality, but with qualifications.[13]  Inasmuch as this concurrence was essential to the Court’s holding, it can be said that it is the O’Connor opinion that is controlling.  Working with the framework she developed previously in Agostini v. Felton,[14] Justice O’Connor determined that the program at issue did not violate the Establishment Clause because it furthered a secular purpose, did not have the primary effect of advancing religion,[15] and did not raise the likelihood that an “objective observer”[16] would believe the program was a governmental endorsement of a particular religion. 

 

It is important to note that, as part of this analysis, Justice O’Connor, like the Helms plurality, explicitly rejected the precedents of Meek v. Pittinger [17] and Wolman v. Walter,[18] which had held even the capability for (as opposed to the actual) diversion of government aid to religious purposes to be sufficient grounds to render an otherwise neutral aid program an Establishment Clause violation.[19]  Justice O’Connor embraced this position even after distancing herself from what she characterized as the “plurality’s conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause.”[20]  Finally, Justice O’Connor stressed that the aid provided under the education grant program was “secular, neutral and non-ideological,” supplemented funds from private sources, and was expressly prohibited from being used for religious instruction purposes.[21]

 

Taking all of these considerations together, it is possible to construct a regime under which faith-based organizations may receive government social service grants in a manner consistent with the latest interpretation of the Establishment Clause.[22]  This regime is evidenced in the previously enacted charitable choice laws and in your bill,  S.304.  The eligibility criteria for receiving a grant are religion neutral.[23]  The grant program serves the secular purpose of providing social welfare services to needy individuals.  The grant funds are expressly prohibited from being “expended for sectarian worship, instruction or proselytization.”[24]  And Justice O’Connor’s sophisticated “objective observer” would not believe that government support for the faith-based provider under this legislation constituted the endorsement of the particular religion.[25]  Moreover, the bill’s accounting and auditing requirements[26] are a safeguard against the diversion of funds for religious purposes, as well as an appropriate means of ensuring that public funds are expended for their specifically intended programmatic purposes.[27]

 

Free Exercise of Religion Considerations; For Program Beneficiaries

There are other safeguards in charitable choice laws that are not necessitated by the Establishment Clause, but by the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause – a feature of the First Amendment that ought to carry equal weight to the Establishment Clause but, for a variety of reasons, often seems forgotten – even by the Supreme Court.[28]

 

As members of a minority religion in this country, we in the Orthodox Jewish community are terribly sensitive to the issue of religious coercion in general, and certainly in situations where government support, albeit indirect, is involved.  We believe government should bolster the “first freedom” of religious liberty at every opportunity.  Thus, we would insist that there be adequate safeguards to prevent any eligible beneficiary from being religiously coerced by a government-supported service provider.  We believe that a requirement that each beneficiary be entitled to a readily accessible alternative service program and that each beneficiary be put on specific notice that they are entitled to such an alternative is the proper method for dealing with this issue.  Moreover, as a condition for receiving federal assistance, faith providers must agree not to refuse to serve an eligible beneficiary on the basis of their religion or their refusal to hold a particular religious belief.  These safeguards are contained in S.304.[29]

 

Free Exercise of Religion Considerations; For Faith-Based Providers

There are also critical religious liberty considerations with regard to the protections afforded to religious organizations by the Constitution and federal civil rights laws.  As you are already aware, the one that has received considerable attention from critics of the faith-based initiative is the thirty-seven year old federal law[30] permitting religious organizations to hire employees on the basis of religion.[31]  A few basic points must be made with regard to this argument which, I believe, will set the record straight and refute the accusation that suggests that all American houses of worship are, in fact, houses of bigotry.

 

As the members of this Committee are well aware, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the great bulwark against objectionable acts of discrimination and Title VII of that Act bans discrimination in employment on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and national origin.  It was the very same architects of modern civil rights law who created a narrow exemption in the 1964 Act permitting churches, synagogues and all other religious organizations to make hiring decisions on the basis of religion.[32] 

 

It would be absurd, to say the least, to suggest that a Catholic parish could be subjected to a federal lawsuit if it refused to hire a Jew for its pulpit.  In 1972, still the heyday of civil rights reforms, Congress expanded the statutory exemption to apply to virtually all employees of religious institutions, whether they serve in clergy positions or not.  The  Free Exercise Clause demands this broad protection, and in 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Title VII exemption as constitutional.[33]

 

This well-established law has now become a central feature of the opposition to charitable choice; so much so that the interest groups who have joined together to fight charitable choice over the last few years have called themselves the “Coalition Against Religious Discrimination” and decry the fact that this initiative will “turn back the clock on civil rights.”

 

In fact, what is happening here is savvy political gamesmanship, not substantive argument.  These very same opponents have lost their argument for the strictest view of church-state separation in the courts and in Congress.  After all, the charitable choice laws that I described earlier received bipartisan support in the face of their protestations. Thus, they have cast about for a more potent political argument, and have found it in invoking the evils of discrimination – something all Americans rightly oppose. 

 

But the assumption underlying the opponents’ assertion is that faith-based hiring by institutions of faith is equal in nature to every other despicable act of discrimination in all other contexts.  This is simply not true.

In fact, in the incredibly diverse and fluid society that is America 2001, religious groups are increasingly open and reflective of that diversity.  There are now black Jews, Asian Evangelicals and white Muslims and these trends will only increase.  This is because, at their core, religious groups are supposed to care not about where you come from or what you look like, only what you believe. [34]  Religious institutions are thus compelled to ignore a person’s heredity and champion his or her more transcendent characteristics.[35]

 

Those who appreciate the role of religious institutions in America should resist the easy equation the opponents assert, for its implications are dangerous indeed.  After all, a defining element of the civil rights era was a commitment to root out invidious forms of discrimination not only in public institutions, but in the private sector – at lunch counters, in motel rooms and on bus lines.  If faith institutions’ hiring practices are so terribly wrong, are we not obligated to oppose them however we can irrespective of whether they receive federal funds?  If, as the critics suggest, your church and my synagogue are such bigoted institutions, why do we offer them the benefit of tax-exempt status?  Why do we afford their supporters tax deductions for their contributions?  Why do we hallow their role in society as we do?

 

There are other arguments to be made against the faith-based initiative over which we may reasonably differ.  Some people may hold fast to a vision of stricter separation of church and state -- even in the face of Supreme Court decisions to the contrary, while others may believe that the best way to serve Americans in need is solely through government agencies.  We ought to vigorously debate these points as we have at this hearing.  But slandering our sacred institutions with the charge of bigotry is unacceptable and must be ruled out of bounds.

 

A second rejoinder, with regard to the specific goals of this policy initiative, is important as well.  If the goal of charitable choice is to leverage the unique capacities of faith-based providers with government grants, to force them to dilute their religious character is the same as saying you don’t believe in the whole enterprise.[36]  The critics, obviously do not, but we believe that, carefully considered and properly structured, expanding the partnership between government and faith-based social service agencies is a critical component of a strategy to bring new solutions to America’s social welfare challenges. 

 

Conclusion

At the end of the day, the debates surrounding the faith-based initiative come down to questions of cynicism versus hope. The cynics see a slippery slope down every path; some see deeply religious people as untrustworthy – incapable of following regulations and perpetually plotting to proselytize their neighbor, while others see every civil servant as a regulator lacking restraint just waiting to emasculate America’s religious institutions.

 

But if we set our minds --  and our hearts --  to it, we can find a way to be more hopeful.  After all, what this is really about is bringing some new hope and some real help to people in need through a new avenue. 



[1]               Remarks by President Bush at University of Notre Dame Commencement Exercises, May 21, 2001.  Attached as Appendix 1.

 

[2]               Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Pub. Law 104-193); Community Services Block Grant (Pub. Law 105-285); Children’s Health Act (Pub. Law 106-310); and Community Renewal Tax Relief Act (Pub. Law 106-554).

[3]               Remarks by Vice President Al Gore on the Role of Faith-Based Organizations, delivered May 24, 1999. Attached as Appendix 2.

 

[4]               Drug Abuse Education, Prevention and Treatment Act of 2001 -- Senators Hatch, Leahy, Biden, DeWine, Feinstein, and Thurmond – sponsors.

 

[5]               See, Diament, A Faith-Based Rorschach Test, The Washington Post, March 20, 2001.

[6]               For this reason, the UOJCA welcomed President Bush’s recently announced plans to increase federal funding allocations for housing rehabilitation and drug treatment program grants.  Notre Dame Commencement Address, Appendix 1.

 

[7]               This is exactly what the four existing charitable choice laws do; they do not provide for the indiscriminate funneling of government funds to churches and synagogues, they do provide that government grant makers cannot red-line such programs out of the funding pool on the sole basis of their religious character.  Moreover, while charitable choice provisions permit participation by faith-based organizations, such participation is not mandated in any way.

 

[8]               “’It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation’…nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).

                The Court will speak again to the Establishment Clause and the neutrality principle before the end of this month when it rules in the pending case of Good News Club v. Milford Central School District.  This case challenges the policy of a New York school district that allows its public school facilities to be used for meetings by a wide range of civic and youth groups after school hours, but refused to allow a Christian youth group to use facilities for its meetings due to their religious content. 

 

[9]               530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (2000). 

 

[10]             This position is clearly enunciated by the plurality opinion of Justices Thomas, Rhenquist, Scalia and Kennedy and is at the core of the concurrence by Justices O’Connor and Breyer. 

[11]             Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97—35, 95 Stat. 469, as amended, 20 U.S.C.§ 7301—7373.

 

[12]             Many public interest organizations, including the UOJCA, filed friend of the court briefs in the Helms case.  Not surprisingly, those who question the neutrality principle today in the context of charitable choice also questioned it there.  It is worth noting that the Solicitor General, on behalf of Secretary of Education Richard Riley, argued in support of the program’s constitutionality.  See, http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/docket/decdocket.html#98-1648.   

 

[13]             Justice O’Connor was not prepared to accept what she viewed as the plurality’s “treatment of neutrality [as a] factor of singular importance” above other factors developed in the Agostini case.  120 S. Ct. at 2556.

 

[14]             521 U.S. 203 (1997), upholding a government funded program for secular special education teachers to teach in parochial schools.  Writing for the Court’s majority in Agostini, Justice O’Connor revised the much-maligned three prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

 

[15]             For Justice O’Connor, the question of whether an aid program has the primary effect of advancing religion is determined by whether: a. the aid is actually diverted for religious indoctrination; b. the eligibility for program participation is made with regard to religion; and c. the program creates excessive administrative entanglement. 

 

[16]             Justice O’Connor’s “objective observer” is not the typical person on the street, but a person “acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute.”  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985). 

 

[17]             421 U.S. 349 (1975).

 

[18]             433 U.S. 229 (1977).

 

[19]             120 S. Ct. at 2562.

 

[20]             120 S. Ct. at 2558.  Justice O’Connor notes that the plurality bases its reasoning for this point on the Court’s precedents that have allowed government aid to be utilized to access religious instruction, specifically Witters v. Washington, 474 U.S. 481 (1983), and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).  O’Connor correctly notes that those cases relied heavily on the “understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student who, in turn, made the choice of where to put that aid to use,”  120 S. Ct. at 2558, as opposed to a per-capita, direct aid program at issue in Helms.  With regard to this issue in this context of direct aid to faith-based social service agencies, see below at note 27.   

 

[21]             120 S. Ct. at 2569.

 

[22]             Of course, Mitchell v. Helms and the long line of school/religion cases that came before it pose Establishment Clause questions squarely in the area of K-12 education, where the Court has been most sensitive to Establishment Clause concerns.  It is quite plausible that an assessment of the constitutionality of charitable choice programs would employ more relaxed criteria than those discussed in the Helms opinion.

 

[23]             S.304, §701(a) provides that “the government shall consider, on the same basis as other nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations to provide assistance…”

 

[24]             S.304, §701(h).

 

[25]             Bipartisan legislation pending in the House of Representatives addresses this point even more explicitly by stating that the receipt of funds by a religious organization “is not and should not be perceived as an endorsement by the government of religion.”  H.R.7, §201(c)(3).

 

[26]             S.304, §701(f).

 

[27]             These last two provisions lessen the need for the aid to flow on the basis of private and independent choices discussed above, note 20.  At the same time, it is certainly the case that any  “voucherized” mechanisms, as opposed to direct grants, for charitable choice will satisfy the conditions set out by Justice O’Connor in this regard.  From a policy standpoint, however, a voucher-based approach has two principle shortcomings; it reinforces the non-neutral treatment of religious entities and it biases against newer participants and programs who cannot overcome start-up costs while waiting for vouchers to be presented by beneficiaries. 

 

[28]             Members of this Committee are well aware of the Court’s recent apathy toward the Free Exercise Clause beginning with Employment Division v. Smith, 474 U.S. 872 (1990), resulting in the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb.  “RFRA” was struck down by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) to which congress, led by members of this Committee, responded last year with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc.

 

[29]             §701(d) and §701(e), respectively.  Some have suggested that allowing a beneficiary to opt out of the faith-related portions of the faith-based agency’s program while being entitled to partake of the secular portions of the program is an appropriate safeguard.  This too is contained in S.304, §701(e)(1):  “A religious organization providing assistance…shall not discriminate…on the basis of…a refusal to actively participate in a religious practice.”  We believe this is insufficient.  It would force beneficiaries to constantly assert their objection in contexts where that might be difficult, if not awkward.  The best safeguard, in the view of the UOJCA, for the religious “objector” is to facilitate his or her participation in an acceptable alternative program.

 

[30]             A recent survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life noted broad support for the faith-based initiative overall, but concerns over permitting religious social service providers to receive government funds while continuing to possess the right to hire on the basis of religion.  At no point, however, was any information offered to the respondents apprising them of the limited nature of the exemption, see below, or its creation as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See, http://pewforum.org/events/0410/report/topline.php3.

 

[31]             Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1, provides in relevant part: “This subchapter shall not apply…to a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”

 

[32]             Religious institutions remain bound by prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and the like.

 

[33]             Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  The majority opinion assumed only “for the sake of argument” that the §702 exemption as enacted in 1964, prior to its 1972 expansion by congress, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause, 483 U.S. at 336, while Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, suggested that the broader exemption was also supported by Free Exercise requirements; he noted that “’[r]eligion included important communal events for most believers.  They exercise their religion through religious organizations, and these organizations must be protected by the [Free Exercise][C]lause.’”  483 U.S. at 341, quoting Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 Colum.L. Rev. 1373, 1389 (1981).  

 

[34]             Secular groups that are ideologically driven – from liberal to conservative – function in a similar manner and enjoy an analogous constitutional protection for their hiring practices under the freedom of expressive association, also recognized under the First Amendment.  Thus, even though Planned Parenthood may receive government grants, it cannot be compelled to hire pro-lifers.

 

[35]             Of course, one cannot overlook the fringe groups such as the Church of the Creator and Aryan Church that propound a “theology” of racial and ethnic hatred and hold themselves out as “religions.”  They are despicable and give mainstream religions a bad name.  But we don’t generally make our public policy decisions on the basis of the radical extremist; we afford everyone the freedom of speech even though it will benefit the neo-Nazi or the flag-burner.  This approach should not be abandoned here.

 

[36]             Again in Vice President Gore’s words, “the religious character [of these organizations] that is so often the key to their effectiveness.”  Appendix 2.  See also, Jeffrey Rosen, Religious Rights, The New Republic, February 26, 2001.