

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—116th Cong., 1st Sess.**

**S. 1227**

To require the Federal Trade Commission to study the role of intermediaries in the pharmaceutical supply chain and provide Congress with appropriate policy recommendations, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. GRASSLEY

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-  
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Prescription Pricing  
5 for the People Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

7 In this Act:

8 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-  
9 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-  
10 gress” means—

1 (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the  
2 Senate; and

3 (B) the Committee on the Judiciary of the  
4 House of Representatives.

5 (2) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission”  
6 means the Federal Trade Commission.

7 **SEC. 3. STUDY OF PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN**  
8 **INTERMEDIARIES AND MERGER ACTIVITY.**

9 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date  
10 of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to  
11 the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

12 (1) addresses at minimum—

13 (A) whether pharmacy benefit managers—

14 (i) charge payers a higher price than  
15 the reimbursement rate at which the phar-  
16 macy benefit managers reimburse phar-  
17 macies owned by the pharmacy benefit  
18 manager and pharmacies not owned by the  
19 pharmacy benefit manager;

20 (ii) steer patients for competitive ad-  
21 vantage to any pharmacy, including a re-  
22 tail, mail-order, or any other type of phar-  
23 macy, in which the pharmacy benefit man-  
24 agers have an ownership interest;

1 (iii) audit or review proprietary data,  
2 including acquisition costs, patient infor-  
3 mation, or dispensing information, of phar-  
4 macies not owned by the pharmacy benefit  
5 manager and use such proprietary data to  
6 increase revenue or market share for com-  
7 petitive advantage; or

8 (iv) use formulary designs to increase  
9 the market share of higher cost prescrip-  
10 tion drugs or depress the market share of  
11 lower cost prescription drugs (each net of  
12 rebates and discounts);

13 (B) trends or observations on the state of  
14 competition in the healthcare supply chain, par-  
15 ticularly with regard to intermediaries and their  
16 integration with other intermediaries, suppliers,  
17 or payers of prescription drug benefits;

18 (C) how companies and payers assess the  
19 benefits, costs, and risks of contracting with  
20 intermediaries, including pharmacy services ad-  
21 ministrative organizations, and whether more  
22 information about the roles of intermediaries  
23 should be available to consumers and payers;  
24 and

1 (D) whether there are any specific legal or  
2 regulatory obstacles the Commission currently  
3 faces in enforcing the antitrust and consumer  
4 protection laws in the pharmaceutical supply  
5 chain, including the pharmacy benefit manager  
6 marketplace and pharmacy services administra-  
7 tive organizations; and

8 (2) provides—

9 (A) observations or conclusions drawn  
10 from the November 2017 roundtable entitled  
11 “Understanding Competition in Prescription  
12 Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain Dy-  
13 namics,” and any similar efforts;

14 (B) specific actions the Commission in-  
15 tends to take as a result of the November 2017  
16 roundtable, and any similar efforts, including a  
17 detailed description of relevant forthcoming ac-  
18 tions, additional research or roundtable discus-  
19 sions, consumer education efforts, or enforce-  
20 ment actions; and

21 (C) policy or legislative recommendations  
22 to—

23 (i) improve transparency and competi-  
24 tion in the pharmaceutical supply chain;

1                   (ii) prevent and deter anticompetitive  
2                   behavior in the pharmaceutical supply  
3                   chain; and

4                   (iii) best ensure that consumers ben-  
5                   efit from any cost savings or efficiencies  
6                   that may result from mergers and consoli-  
7                   dations.

8           (b) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 180 days  
9           after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission  
10          shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress  
11          an interim report on the progress of the report required  
12          by subsection (a), along with preliminary findings and  
13          conclusions based on information collected to that date.

14   **SEC. 4. REPORT.**

15          The Commission shall submit to the appropriate com-  
16          mittees of Congress a report that includes—

17               (1) the number and nature of complaints re-  
18               ceived by the Commission relating to an allegation  
19               of anticompetitive conduct by a manufacturer of a  
20               sole-source drug;

21               (2) the ability of the Commission to bring an  
22               enforcement action against a manufacturer of a sole-  
23               source drug; and

1           (3) policy or legislative recommendations to  
2           strengthen enforcement actions relating to anti-  
3           competitive behavior.