WASHINGTON – House and Senate oversight leaders
are calling on the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to explain its refusal
to update its information sharing policies after the agency watchdog discovered
failures in a 2010 case that led to the trafficking of a firearm to Mexico
where it was used in the shooting death of one federal officer and serious
injury of another. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley and
Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein and House Oversight & Government Reform
Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz and Ranking Member Elijah Cummings today
called on the DEA to provide details of remedial actions taken since the Department
of Justice Inspector General (IG) released its report on the Osorio and Barba
trafficking rings.
The
recent
IG report detailed the events that led to a 2011
attack on two Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, which seriously
wounded Special Agent Victor Avila and killed Special Agent Jaime Zapata. One
of the firearms used in that attack was trafficked by Manuel Gomez Barba, whom
the DEA was investigating for dealing narcotics. During the course of its
investigation, DEA agents obtained information about Barba’s involvement in
firearms trafficking. Despite this information and existing agency policy, the
DEA failed to notify the United States Attorney’s Office or the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). This failure to act led to
Barba’s release from custody, after which he facilitated the purchase and
shipment to Mexico of 10 AK-47 rifles, including one that ended up in the hands
of Avila’s and Zapata’s assailants.
While the IG report recommends clarifications to DEA’s
information sharing policy, the IG reported that DEA has refused to make any
changes, claiming that they already have policies in place that sufficiently
manage the risk related to firearms transfers.
In a
letter
to DEA Acting Administrator Chuck Rosenberg, Grassley, Feinstein, Chaffetz
and Cummings requested records relating to disciplinary actions or remedial
policy changes taken in relation to the events described in the DOJ OIG report
of March 2017. The lawmakers also requested a briefing from DEA officials on
these matters.
“We agree with the OIG that the DEA should
implement a more instructive policy and are troubled by the DEA’s refusal to
implement the OIG’s recommendations and resistance to acknowledge such a
serious problem,” the lawmakers said in the letter.
Grassley, Feinstein, Chaffetz and Cummings previously
received a briefing from Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz
on the investigation, which was originally requested by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and House Oversight Committee in 2012.
Text of the letter can be found
here.
April
4, 2017
VIA
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
Chuck Rosenberg
Acting Administrator
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
Lincoln
Place-West
700 Army Navy Drive
Room 12060
Arlington, VA 22202
Dear Mr. Rosenberg,
On March 2, 2017, the Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General (OIG) issued a report titled, A Review of Investigations
of the Osorio and Barba Firearms Trafficking Rings. The report includes a
review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) narcotics investigation
of Manuel Gomez Barba and its failure to share with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) information obtained about firearms
trafficking during the course of the investigation. The DEA’s failure to share this
information with ATF led to Barba’s release from custody in July 2010, and
allowed Barba to facilitate the purchase and shipment to Mexico of 10 AK-47
rifles, one of which was used in an attack on two Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents. Moreover, the DEA’s failure to share information with
ATF delayed ATF’s discovery of Barba until August 2010 through a separate
firearms investigation. From the time the DEA heard Barba’s statement about the
AK-47s in May 2010, until ATF learned of Barba’s involvement in firearms
trafficking, Barba facilitated the purchase and shipment of more than 45
firearms by seven straw purchasers.
Brief Summary
On May 26, 2010, during a recorded undercover narcotics
operation, Barba stated to a DEA source that he was involved in a firearms deal
involving 20 AK-47s.
[1]
The DEA Special Agent managing the investigation declined to share this
information with ATF because he was not sure it was credible and he thought he
could investigate it further on his own.
[2]
Nonetheless, he documented Barba’s statement in a DEA-6 report of
investigation. The Special Agent told the OIG, “as you become a more seasoned
investigator, you learn that some of this information is credible, and some of
it is not.”
[3]
Although the DEA’s mission is not to investigate firearms
trafficking leads, the Special Agent also told the OIG that he thought he could
investigate the statement on his own:
[T]here was no way that I could have verified this
information unless I was able to sit down with [Barba] and interview him in a .
. . post-interview or post-arrest setting. And I felt like that once we
arrested this Barba, and we were able to, if we could get him to cooperate, or
in that setting, then we could explore this information.
[4]
The DEA Acting Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the
Beaumont Resident Office told the OIG that, on June 2, 2010, he reviewed the
Special Agent’s DEA-6 and was concerned by Barba’s firearm trafficking
statement.
[5] However, the Acting RAC and the
Special Agent still failed to provide information to ATF, local law
enforcement, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas
(USAO). The Acting RAC told the OIG that he thought he or the Special Agent may
have told the Baytown Police Department about Barba’s statement, but neither
the Acting RAC nor the Special Agent had any specific recollection of doing so.
[6] Moreover, the OIG could not find a
lead sheet recording any disclosure from the DEA to ATF, local law enforcement,
or the USAO.
[7] Even the task
force officer from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department who was working on
the case with the DEA told the OIG that the DEA did not inform him of Barba’s
statements and that he did not know about the statements until after the
Zapata/Avila shooting.
[8]
The Acting RAC and the Special Agent decided they would
investigate the statement themselves by arresting Barba during a second
undercover narcotics operation.
[9]
The Acting RAC told the OIG that the DEA took the statement seriously and it
was the reason they arrested Barba less than a week after the Acting RAC
learned of the statement.
[10]
Yet, when the DEA arrested Barba on June 17, 2010, the agents failed to
question him about the firearms trafficking statement.
Additionally, the Acting RAC and Special Agent again
failed to alert the USAO to the statement.
[11]
Rather, the Special Agent recommended that the USAO request Barba’s release
from detention so that the DEA could use Barba as a source.
[12]
The Special Agent omitted Barba’s statement from the affidavit he drafted for
the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) about the narcotics investigation
and failed to mention the statement in a conversation with the AUSA about
Barba’s detention and the request for release.
[13]
The AUSA told the OIG that he would expect an affidavit to include that kind of
information “because that bears on whether there’s going to be a detention
hearing and whether [Barba] gets out.”
[14]
The AUSA told the OIG that he had no knowledge about Barba’s statement until the
OIG asked him about it, and asserted that he would not have agreed to Barba’s
release if he had known about it.
[15]
The AUSA’s lack of knowledge of Barba’s statement is potentially in part due
to his failure to review materials that the DEA claims it provided to the USAO,
including the recording of the narcotics operation and the DEA-6 form, both of
which contain Barba’s statement. However, despite the DEA Special Agent’s
certainty that he provided DEA materials to the USAO, the OIG was unable to
find them in the USAO’s official file on the Barba case, and could not find any
record of transmittal.
[16]
Even if the DEA did provide the DEA-6 and the recording, the DEA nonetheless
should have alerted the AUSA to Barba’s statement. A detained individual’s statement about his
involvement in dangerous, felonious activity is relevant to the USAO’s case
against him and is particularly relevant to the AUSA’s decision to request a
release from detention. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas,
John Bales, told the OIG that Barba’s statement “should have been the biggest thing [the DEA
agents] talked about” following the narcotics operation and that “it’s very
upsetting to read [Paragraph 9 of the DEA-6] now and understand what happened
later.”
[17]
It is particularly alarming that a DEA Special Agent
advocated for the release of an individual who disclosed his involvement in
firearms trafficking. The DEA’s failure to share this information with the
agency primarily responsible for investigating firearms trafficking and its
failure to alert the AUSA handling Barba’s case was irresponsible and
demonstrates seriously flawed judgment. The Acting RAC’s claim that the DEA
took seriously a statement about firearms trafficking is irreconcilable with
the DEA’s failure to notify the agency of jurisdiction.
Barba was released from custody on July 26, 2010.
[18] Just three weeks after his release,
on August 20, 2010, Barba recruited Robert Riendfliesh to purchase 10 AK-47
rifles to ship to Mexico.
[19]
One of these rifles was later identified at the scene of a February 15, 2011,
attack in Mexico in which assailants shot ICE Special Agents Jaime Zapata and
Victor Avila, killing Zapata and seriously injuring Avila.
[20]
DEA Policy on Coordination with Other Agencies
The OIG report found that the DEA’s failure to share
information with ATF in the Barba investigation violated the DEA’s policy on
sharing information regarding uncontrolled firearms transfers.
[21] However, the OIG also found that
confusion surrounding the policy illustrates the need for changes to the policy
to establish a “more explicit and comprehensive” policy that “identifies for
agents when they should contact ATF about firearms transfers.”
[22] According to the OIG, the DEA
disagrees with this recommendation and has declined to update its policy,
despite previous recommendations to do so following the OIG’s review of
Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver.
[23]
Both the DEA Special Agent and the Acting RAC told the
OIG that they did not believe the DEA’s policy on information required them to
share Barba’s statement with ATF.
[24]
Section 6612.42 of the DEA’s Agent Manual requires that sources be questioned
about their knowledge of “nondrug related criminal activities,” and requires
coordination with the responsible law enforcement agency if the information in
question concerns a serious criminal offense, such as a felony.
[25] The OIG disagreed with the DEA and
wrote in its report:
In our view, the analysis is straightforward: [The
Special Agent] debriefed the source following the source’s participation in an
undercover meeting that included statements from a drug dealer about a
transaction for 20 AK-47s; that transaction constituted a “serious federal
offense;” and [the Special Agent] had a duty to “thoroughly question” the
source about the source’s knowledge of Barba’s nondrug related criminal
activities, to include the transaction in question. Under these circumstances,
we believe DEA’s debriefing policy applied and that the coordination provision
was triggered.
[26]
The OIG also wrote:
We received no cogent explanation for why DEA did not
promptly contact ATF’s Beaumont Resident Office, DEA’s counterpart in the region and the agency with expertise in
handling firearms investigations, with the information as soon as DEA learned
of it, especially in light of the quantity and type of firearm that Barba
mentioned, and we do not believe there was any excuse for DEA’s failure to do
so.
. . .
We believe the DEA’s handling of Barba’s statements about
a deal for 20 AK-47s both illustrates and reaffirms the importance of our
recommendation that DEA establish a policy that identifies for agents when they
should contact ATF about firearms transfers.
[27]
According to the OIG, the DEA claims that “the risks
related to firearms transfers were sufficiently managed through other policies”
[28] and that “common sense” provides
enough guidance to agents.
[29]
We agree with the OIG that the DEA should implement a more instructive policy
and are troubled by the DEA’s refusal to implement the OIG’s recommendations
and resistance to acknowledge such a serious problem. Moreover, holding
accountable those who fail to exercise their duties to preserve public safety
is just as important as policy changes.
Accordingly, please schedule a briefing on these matters
as soon as possible with staff from the Committees, and also provide the
following to the Committees as soon as possible, but no later than noon on
April 18, 2017:
1.
All documents referring or relating to
disciplinary or remedial actions the DEA has taken related to events described
in the OIG’s March 2017 report.
2.
All documents and communications referring or
relating to the DEA’s decision not to introduce policies related to sharing
information about firearms transfers despite the OIG’s previous recommendations
to do so.
3.
Does the DEA plan to introduce new policies
related to information-sharing with other agencies, including ATF?
a.
If yes, please describe the details of such
policies.
b.
If no, why not?
4.
What steps has the DEA taken to improve
information-sharing with other agencies?
Please produce all documents in electronic format and
deliver your responses to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff
in Room 224 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building and the Minority Staff in
Room 152 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, and to the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff in Room 2157 of the Rayburn
House Office Building and the Minority Staff in Room 2471 of the Rayburn House
Office Building.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has oversight
jurisdiction over the DEA. The House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and
may at “any time” investigate “any matter” as set forth in House Rule X.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation with this
request. Please number your responses according to their corresponding
questions. If you have questions, please contact Samantha Brennan of Chairman
Grassley’s staff at (202) 224-5225, Rajiv Venkataramanan of Ranking Member
Feinstein’s staff at (202) 224-7703, Cordell Hull of Chairman Chaffetz’ staff
at (202) 225-5074, or Peter Kenny of Ranking Members Cummings’ staff at (202)
225-5051.
Sincerely,
Charles E.
Grassley
Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Senate Judiciary Committee
Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
The Honorable Elijah Cummings
Ranking Member
House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee
cc: The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
-30-
[1] Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Oversight & Review Div. 17-01, A Review of Investigations of the
Osorio and Barba Firearms Trafficking Rings at 73 (2017) [hereinafter
2017 OIG Report].
[19] Id. at 86. Riendfliesh
told the OIG that Barba instructed him on how to purchase the rifles and
deliver them to Barba’s associates, gave Riendfliesh money to pay for the
rifles, and paid him an additional $650.
Id. One of Barba’s associates
brought the rifles to Barba’s parents’ home in Baytown, Texas, where the serial
numbers were removed. Then, Barba’s boss—a man Barba identified as
“Gil”—arranged for an associate to pick the guns up for shipment to Mexico.
Id. at 90.
[23] Briefing by Office of Inspector
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to staff, S. Comm. on Judiciary and H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Mar. 3, 2017). The 2012 OIG review recommended:
“The Department should review the policies and procedures of its other law
enforcement components to ensure that they are sufficient to address the
concerns we have identified in the conduct of Operations Wide Receiver and Fast
and Furious . . . .”
Office of
Inspector Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice,
A Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters at 429 (2012). In a 2016 follow-up report, the
OIG noted:
We also found
that the DEA . . . did not have policies that addressed when to contact ATF
about uncontrolled firearms transfers. . . . DEA brought to our attention its
policies on the “Debriefing of Confidential Sources,” which provide that if the
non-drug related information provided from a confidential source “concerns a
serious criminal offense (e.g. a felony), or a crime which is planned to be
committed, then action will be taken to coordinate with supervisory personnel
of the responsible law enforcement agency, and/or with federal or state
prosecutor [sic].” These policies also reference DEA’s “Guide to Source
Debriefing,” which identify possible questions regarding firearms, ammunition,
and explosives. Our review of DEA’s policies determined that they were not
sufficiently explicit and comprehensive to address the problems we identified
in our report on Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver.
Office of
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Oversight & Review Div. 16-01, A Review of the Department of Justice’s and
ATF’s Implementation of Recommendations Contained in the OIG’s Report on
Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver at 18 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 OIG Report].
[24]
2017
OIG Report at 76–77.
[28] 2016 OIG Report at 18.
[29] 2017 OIG Report at 102.