WASHINGTON
– Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley pressed for answers on how
an FBI translator was
reportedly able to travel to Syria and
marry the ISIS operative who she was supposed to be investigating.
In a
letter
to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Acting FBI Director Andrew
McCabe, Grassley sought information about how the romantic relationship
developed without the FBI’s knowledge. He also inquired about any previous or
newly implemented policies that could address incidents like this, about the
screening process for hiring contractors and any reviews or disciplinary
actions taken as a result of this incident.
Grassley
also asked for an explanation of the Justice Department’s decision to pursue a
seemingly lenient plea deal in light of the potential national security
implications of this incident.
“This
rogue employee had access to highly sensitive national security information.
I’m troubled that a relationship between an FBI employee and a prominent ISIS
recruiter went unnoticed, and more troubled that there wasn’t a safeguard to successfully
catch this incident,” Grassley said. “It’s important for the public to
understand how this happened and how similar problems will be prevented in the
future. We also need to know how prosecutors settled on the charges in this
case. A sentence of two years seems unusually light for such a potential threat
to national security.”
Full text
of the
letter
follows.
May
10, 2017
VIA
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
The Honorable Rod J. Rosenstein
Deputy Attorney
General
U.S. Department of
Justice
950 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington,
D.C. 20530
Andrew McCabe
Acting Director
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
935 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20535
Dear Deputy
Attorney General Rosenstein and Acting Director McCabe:
According to
recent news reports, in June 2014, Daniela Greene, an FBI translator with a
top-secret clearance, traveled to Syria and married an ISIS recruiter named
Denis Cuspert, a.k.a. Abu Talha al-Almani.
Reports state
that Greene was a foreign-born FBI contract linguist. She started working for
the FBI in 2011, and in January 2014 she was assigned to the Detroit Field
office to investigate Cuspert. Cuspert had attracted the attention of
counter-terrorism authorities, including the FBI, because of his growing
influence as an online recruiter for violent jihadists. Reportedly, Greene
alerted Cuspert that he was the subject of an FBI investigation and shared classified
information with him.
On June 11, 2014,
Greene filled out a Report of Foreign Travel Form, claiming that she was taking
a “Vacation/Personal” trip to Germany to visit her parents. Instead, on June
23, 2014, she flew on a one-way ticket to Istanbul, Turkey, and then traveled
to Gaziantep, which is approximately 20 miles from the Syrian border. With
assistance from one of Cuspert’s associates, she crossed the border into Syria
and married him.
Apparently,
Greene quickly regretted her decision and somehow returned to the United States
where she was arrested upon her arrival on August 8, 2014. She cooperated with
authorities and pled guilty in December 2014 to making false statements
involving international terrorism. Greene was sentenced to two years in federal
prison and was released in August 2016.
The Committee
requests additional information about how an FBI contractor, unbeknownst to the
FBI, engaged in a romantic relationship with the subject of a counterterrorism
investigation and traveled to Syria to marry him. Additionally, the Committee
requests information about the Department’s decision to offer Greene a plea
deal. Please provide the following
information and a
briefing to Committee staff no later than
May 24, 2017.
1. How
and when did the FBI become aware that Greene had engaged in a romantic
relationship with Cuspert? Please explain how this relationship developed
without the FBI’s knowledge.
2. How
and when did the FBI become aware that Greene had traveled to Syria?
3. What
information does the Report of Travel form collect? Please explain the review
and approval process for these forms.
a. Does
the FBI take steps to verify the information provided on these forms prior to
approving them?
b. Does
the FBI take steps to verify that the employee or contractor adheres to the
travel itinerary provided on the form?
4. What
steps has the FBI taken to ensure a similar incident will not happen in the
future? Please explain.
5. Did
the FBI discipline any employees or contractors as a result of these
circumstances? Please explain in detail, why or why not?
6. Please
explain the screening and training processes that the FBI requires for its
contractors and provide copies of the relevant training materials.
7. Please
explain the Department’s decision to offer Greene a plea deal and to argue for
her to receive a reduced sentence.
I anticipate that your written
reply and any responsive documents will be unclassified.
Please send all unclassified material directly to
the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of
Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain
classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified
information directly to the
Committee, and provide
a classified addendum to the Office of
Senate Security. Although the Committee complies with all
laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, it is not bound, absent
its prior agreement, by any handling
restrictions or instructions on unclassified information unilaterally asserted by the Executive Branch.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you
have any questions, please contact Katherine Nikas or Samantha
Brennan of my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
cc: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
The
Honorable Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector
General
U.S. Department of Justice
The Honorable
John F. Kelly
Secretary
U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
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