WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Chuck Grassley and Senator Patrick Leahy today are pressing the
Justice Department on its progress implementing whistleblower protections at
the FBI.
In a letter to Attorney General
Jeff Sessions, Grassley and Leahy outline a series of concerns about
whistleblower protections that have gone unaddressed despite government reports
drawing attention to these problems and recommending changes. The
Justice Department’s own report from 2014 identified “key
systemic problems” in protecting FBI whistleblowers under agency’s current
regime.
“While the Department has taken
initial steps to improve the timelines and effectiveness of its whistleblower
program, it has failed to implement most of its own recommendations,” the
Senators wrote.
Grassley and Leahy are inquiring
about the Justice Department’s ability to gauge the success of the steps it has
already taken to improve its response to whistleblower claims, like its
voluntary mediation program and additional attorney work at the Office of
Attorney Recruitment and Management to process claims. The senators are also
seeking information on initiatives the department has yet to undertake to
improve whistleblowers’ access to historic data to inform how to properly move
forward with their cases. Further, the senators are requesting details on what
criteria have been established for granting whistleblower hearings, why the
Justice Department does not provide status updates or timelines on pending
whistleblower cases, what progress has been made on considering provisions for
compensatory damages for whistleblowers who suffer retaliation and other unincorporated
practices that could better protect whistleblowers.
Grassley and Leahy have long
championed whistleblower protections and have coauthored bipartisan legislation
like the Whistleblower Protection Act of 2012 and the FBI Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2016.
Full text of the
letter
from Grassley and Leahy follows.
September 20,
2017
VIA
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
The
Honorable Jeff Sessions
Attorney
General
U.S.
Department of Justice
Washington,
D.C.
Dear
Attorney General Sessions:
In response to Presidential Policy
Directive 19 of October 2012 (“PPD-19”),
[1] the Department of
Justice examined the effectiveness of the FBI whistleblower regulations in an
April 2014 report (DOJ Report) to President Obama.
[2] The Department
released its report on October 17, 2014, following a request from Senators
Grassley and Wyden.
[3] The DOJ Report outlined the Department’s review of
the current regulations, policies, and procedures governing the receipt,
investigation, and adjudication of FBI whistleblower complaints.
[4]
The report also analyzed the Department’s handling of those complaints,
identified key systemic problems and challenges in protecting FBI
whistleblowers under the agency’s current regulations and practices, and
suggested eleven recommendations for improvement.
[5]
The DOJ Report, along with a
comprehensive review conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
determined that regulatory limits should be expanded regarding who may receive
“protected disclosures” from FBI employees.
[6] The expansion was
intended to retain the benefit of channeling on-site disclosures to persons
with authority to redress wrongdoing once identified.
[7] However, the
Department did not expand the definition of persons to whom a protected
disclosure may be made to include an FBI employee’s immediate supervisor, and
therefore, many whistleblower complaints were dismissed when employees followed
FBI policy and reported wrongdoing through their chain of command.
[8]
The Congress addressed this issue when it passed the FBI Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act in December 2016, a bill that I co-authored with my
colleague, then-Ranking Member Patrick Leahy.
[9] The FBI WPEA
clarified that Congress intended to protect FBI employees for disclosing
wrongdoing to supervisors and officers within their chain of command, the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and Members of Congress.
[10]
While the Department has taken initial
steps to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of its whistleblower program,
it has failed to implement most of its own recommendations. Therefore, I write
today to inquire about the status and effectiveness of the Department’s
programmatic efforts to improve the whistleblower program as well as the
timeline of expected regulatory updates.
Program
Improvements
The DOJ Report noted several changes
the Department could enact on its own to improve the whistleblower program for
FBI employees, including jumpstarting a mediation program, updating its
training, and hiring additional staff. According to the DOJ report, in the
spring of 2014, the Department launched a “voluntary mediation program” for FBI
whistleblowers.
[11] The aim of the program is to assist in resolving
cases in a timely manner, particularly where the positions of the two parties
are not very far apart. The GAO review found that two complainants pursued
mediation, though since their cases were still pending, it was too soon to
analyze the overall impact of the program.
[12]
The Department also stated its
intention to improve training for FBI employees by providing the appropriate
information on how to make protected disclosures and increasing employee
awareness of the whistleblower program. According to DOJ, the agency has
finally updated its training as of August 2017 to reflect the changes in the law
that now explicitly protects disclosures to supervisors as well as to the OSC
and Congress.
[13]Lastly,
to help improve delays in case processing time, the Department reported that it
hired an additional part-time attorney to work on adjudicating reprisal cases
at the Department’s Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (OARM).
[14]
While OARM officials reported that they have reduced overall case processing
times, “in good part because of the work of the part-time attorney,”
[15]
no further information was provided about how the Department came to assess the
impact of this additional staff assistance.
Changes
Under Consideration
The Department indicated it would
explore the possibility of additional changes that did not require formal
rulemaking, including, for example, publishing OARM decisions, adjudicating FBI
whistleblower reprisal complaints, and holding hearings in reprisal cases.
Since the Department does not publish
OARM decisions, FBI whistleblowers do not have access to any body of case
precedent should they suffer reprisal and choose to seek relief. The FBI, by
contrast, can readily draw upon case precedent, which creates a significant
imbalance in the fairness of these proceedings. The Department stated in its
report that it would consider publicizing decisions, but noted that the process
would be difficult due to the presence of law enforcement sensitive and other private
information.
[16] However, in October 2013, the Department provided
a publicized decision in response to a motion for public disclosure, and thus,
is plainly capable of preparing its decisions for public release. To date, the
Department has not published any additional decisions or committed to doing so.
Yet, statute, case law, and FOIA guidelines all indicate that the Department
should be publishing these decisions consistent with the requirements of FOIA
and the practice of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
[17]
Additionally,
the Department has discretionary power over its decision to grant a
whistleblower a hearing. In its report, the Department rejected whistleblower
advocates’ recommendation to grant whistleblowers hearings in all cases upon
request, but agreed to consider whether it should establish a set of criteria
to use when deciding whether to grant a hearing or not, such as the need to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
[18]
Recommended
Regulatory Amendments
The
statutory protections for FBI whistleblowers have always required that the
President “provide for the[ir] enforcement . . . in a manner consistent with
applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 1221 of . . . title [5].”
[19]
The Department’s regulations, however, unduly narrowed those provisions when it
applied them to the FBI and failed to update those regulations consistent with
the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012.
[20]
Thus, the WPEA amendments providing for the award of compensatory damages and
certain fees and costs for other Title 5 whistleblowers, were not incorporated
into the Department’s regulations for FBI employees.
[21] According
to its 2014 Report, the Department supported amending its regulations to
provide for compensatory damages in addition to other available relief, but has
not acted on that commitment.
[22] Notably, the Department did not
commit to amend its regulations consistent with section 1221(g) (4), also as
amended in 2012, which provides for corrective action to “include fees, costs,
or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee,
if such investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for
the disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective
action.”
[23] It is worth noting again, however, that such
corrective action has been available since the passage of the WPEA given the
statute’s incorporation of those sections.
In
addition, the Department recommended “formalizing” its mediation program, and
its process of referring reprisal findings to the FBI’s Director and Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR), to allow for disciplinary action against
retaliators,
[24] and implementing “show cause” orders such as those
used in MSPB proceedings for other Title 5 employees to resolve jurisdictional
questions more efficiently.
[25] The Department also stated it
would “consider” amending its regulations to level the playing field for FBI
whistleblowers who traditionally have been unable to cross examine or depose
witnesses relied on by the FBI because they left the Bureau.
[26]
The Committee requires additional,
updated information about the status of all efforts to implement the
Department’s recommendations and address outstanding issues regarding the FBI
whistleblower protection program. Accordingly, please provide written responses
to the following questions by October 4, 2017 about the status of all ongoing
efforts to address these issues within the FBI whistleblower program.
1.
What
steps has the Department taken to measure the effectiveness of its efforts to
improve the resolution of cases and decrease significant delays?
a.
Please
describe whether, and how, the mediation program has affected case processing.
b.
Please
provide the number of cases resolved through mediation since the program began
compared to the number of complaints received.
c.
Has
the Department taken steps to obtain and document feedback from parties
regarding the mediation program?
d.
How
has the addition of a part-time attorney affected case processing time and
quality?
e.
The
Department stated that it is almost “impossible”
[27] to meet strict
deadlines for adjudication due to the voluminous evidentiary records and
complexity of these legal disputes, but it would make some procedural changes
to decrease case processing times while preserving a degree of flexibility.
Please explain any and all procedural changes that have been implemented, as
well as the Department’s ongoing efforts to construct more flexible judicial
deadlines.
2.
GAO
found that the Department failed to meet basic regulatory requirements for
reporting and handling complaints in a timely manner, including acknowledging
receipt of complaints, providing regular updates on complaint status, and
reasonable grounds for determinations within 240 days. In response, OPR took
steps to upgrade its case management system, however, it did not provide a
clear implementation plan for systematically tracking investigators’ compliance
with regulatory reporting requirements.
a.
What
progress is being made to track and monitor compliance with regulatory
requirements within the Department?
b.
How
has OPR tailored its new case management system or otherwise developed an
oversight mechanism to capture information on the office’s compliance with
regulatory requirements?
3.
The
Department concurred with GAO’s recommendation to provide parties with
estimated time frames for returning decisions, however, to date, neither OARM
nor the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) regularly provides complainants with time
estimates for final decisions. Meanwhile, other federal agencies, including the
MSPB and the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, are statutorily
required to provide time estimates and complete investigations within specified
periods. When asked by the Committee about the Department’s failure to
implement this recommendation, DOJ officials claimed that producing reasonable
estimates was contingent upon case support and legal review from the Justice
Management Division Office of General Counsel (JMD OGC), though DAG previously
stated that it was itself responsible for providing time frame estimates.
[28]
According to the GAO report, OIG and OPR were able to provide the first status
update within the 90-day time frame, but both offices failed to meet time
frames for subsequent status updates.
a.
Why
is the Department unable to provide at least some complainants with
case-specific estimates that take into account the specifics of the particular
complaint?
b.
What
plans does the Department have to increase and improve communication between
investigators and complainants within required time frames?
4.
The
Department rejected whistleblower advocates’ recommendation that OARM grant all
hearings upon request, citing witness credibility as the “most directly
relevant factor”
[29] for determining whether a hearing is held. Has the
Department finalized a list of criteria to use when evaluating witness
credibility? If yes, please provide a copy of those criteria. If not, why not?
5.
Will
the Department publish its decisions in FBI whistleblower cases? Why or why
not? If so, when?
6.
Please
describe the steps that the Department has taken to implement each of its
proposed regulatory changes.
7.
While
the Department disagreed with whistleblower advocates’ recommendation that
administrative law judges are necessary in order to ensure adjudications are
impartial, it did agree to consider amending its regulations to “make explicit
what has always been implicit regarding the independence and impartiality of
OARM determinations.”
[30] What is the status of this
recommendation? How does the Department intend to ensure employees have
confidence in the “independence and impartiality of OARM determinations”?
Thank you in advance for your
cooperation with this request. If you have questions, contact DeLisa Lay of my
Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.
Sincerely,
Charles
E. Grassley Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Member
Senate
Judiciary Committee Senate Judiciary Committee
cc:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking
Member
Senate
Judiciary Committee
-30-
[1] The White House,
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19 (Oct. 10, 2012), at 5 [Hereinafter
“PPD-19”].
[5] Id. at 7-19;
Letter re: DOJ Report at 2-4.
[6] DOJ Report at 13;
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15-112, Whistleblower Protection:
Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ’s Handling of FBI Retaliation
Complaints 18 (2015) [Hereinafter ‘GAO Report”].
[8] DOJ Report at 13;
GAO Report at 14, 19 n. 41 (citing Policy Directive 0032D, Non-Retaliation for
Reporting Compliance Risks (Feb. 11, 2008) and Policy Directive 0727D Update
(Sept. 23, 2014)).
[9] S. 2390, 114th Cong.
(as of April 2016).
[11] DOJ Report at
11-12.
[13] Letter from Gregory
A. Brower, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau
of Investigation to Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary (May 16, 2017); Act of Dec. 16, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-302 (130 Stat.
1516).
[14] DOJ Report at
17-18.
[17] 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring that final opinions in the adjudication of cases
be made available for inspection and copying);
see also NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1975) (observing that the
proactive disclosure provision “represents a strong congressional aversion to
‘secret [agency] law,’ . . . and represents an affirmative congressional
purpose to require disclosure of documents which have ‘the force and effect of
law’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 7 (1966)); Memorandum from Attorney
General Holder on FOIA Guidelines (Mar. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdf (“[A]gencies should readily and systematically post
information online in advance of any public request.”).
[18] DOJ Report at 20;
28 C.F.R. 27.4(e)(3).
[19] 5 U.S.C. § 2303(c)
(2012).
[20] Pub. L. No.
112-199, § 104, 126 Stat. 1465, 1468-69 (inserting “any other any other
reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages, and compensatory damages
(including interest, reasonable expert witness fees, and costs)” and providing
that corrective action “may include may include fees, costs, or damages
reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation of the employee, if such
investigation was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for the
disclosure or protected activity that formed the basis of the corrective
action”).
[21] See 28
C.F.R. 27.4(f).
[23] 5 U.S.C. §
1221(g)(4) (2012);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 1214(h) (2012).
[24] DOJ Report at 11,
DOJ Letter at 3.
[25] DOJ Report at
16-17.
[28] Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t.
of Justice (Sept. 29, 2015), available at, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-09-29%20CEG%20to%20DOJ%20(Darin%20Jones%20Follow-Up).pdf.