WASHINGTON – Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley is requesting a full-scale review
of the Diversity Visa lottery program that has been used by foreign terrorists,
human traffickers and fraudsters to immigrate permanently to the United States.
The program has received renewed scrutiny following the October 31 terrorist attack in New York City by a
Diversity Visa recipient.
The
Diversity Visa program sets aside 55,000 visas every year, permitting aliens
selected via a lottery system—regardless of their ties to the United States and
with minimal qualifications—to apply for an immigrant visa. Each approved
applicant may also bring to the United States spouses and children, making the
annual total of immigrants who arrive through this program much higher.
The
program is susceptible to fraud and many Diversity Visa applicants are from
developing nations, where fraudulent documentation may be more readily available
and more difficult to verify. As a result, the program has also been exploited
by human traffickers and others who make false claims of familial ties in order
to permit other foreign nationals to immigrate to the United States. A 2007 Government
Accountability Office report raised concerns that widespread use of
fake foreign government documents presented a security risk to the United
States, and a 2003 State Department Inspector General report underscored risks
of granting Diversity Visas to individuals from countries designated as state
sponsors of terrorism. Recent events suggest that these and other national
security concerns have never been fully resolved.
In
a letter last week to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Grassley seeks a full
assessment of the Diversity Visa program, including the cost of the program and
how the department mitigates risks of fraud and exploitation.
Full
text of Grassley’s letter
follows.
November
20, 2017
VIA ELECTRONIC
TRANSMISSION
The Honorable
Rex W. Tillerson
Secretary
U.S. Department
of State
Washington,
D.C. 20520
Dear Secretary
Tillerson:
I
am writing as a follow-up to my letter of November 1, 2017, in which I
requested information about the Diversity Visa (DV) recipient who carried out
the October 31 terrorist attack in New York City.[1] Since then, reports of additional DV recipients
in the U.S. with suspected ties to terror have surfaced.[2]
For example, days before the October 31 attack, the Department of Justice
announced that another Uzbek national and DV lottery winner, Abdurasul
Hasanovich Juraboev, was sentenced to 15 years in prison after pleading guilty
to conspiring to provide material support to the Islamic State, for acts that
occurred in 2014.[3] In 2009, Pakistani
national and DV recipient Syed Haris Ahmed was convicted of terrorism related
activities.[4] In 2002, another
Pakistani national and DV recipient, Imran Mandhai, pled guilty to conspiring
to bomb several locations near Miami, Florida. [5]
Also in 2002, DV recipient Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedeyat perpetrated a terrorist
attack on U.S. soil, when he shot and killed two people at Los Angeles
International Airport on the 4th of July.[6]
Because
the State Department has single handedly administered this statutorily mandated
program since its inception in the 1990s, placing the Department in a unique
position to provide feedback, I am requesting your candid assessment of the
program’s operation and merits.
As you know,
the Diversity Visa program was created when the Immigration Act of 1990 amended[7] the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) to create a new class of “diversity immigrants.”[8]
The law currently provides a maximum of 55,000 DVs[9]
each fiscal year to be made available to aliens from countries with low rates
of immigration to the United States. The State Department’s Kentucky Consular
Center (KCC) oversees the complex “lottery” system whereby aliens register for
the chance to be selected at random and, if selected, are then permitted to
submit a DV application.[10]
Although millions apply for the lottery each year,[11] KCC “processes approximately 125,000
registrants (both principals and dependents).”[12]
This number appears to be substantially larger than the 55,000 visa annual cap
because once approved, DV immigrants may bring along spouses and children under
the age of twenty-one.[13]
Since
the October 31 terror attacks, calls for elimination of the DV program have
become increasingly strident.[14] As
one commentator noted, every year thousands of diversity visas are awarded to
aliens from countries that have been flagged by the U.S. government for
terrorism scrutiny.[15]
“[L]etting people into America from these terror-rocked nations through a
veritable game of chance is bizarre and potentially suicidal,” he argued,
noting that more than 65,000 aliens from such high risk countries have been
welcomed through the DV program since 2007.[16]
Although the October 31 attacker was not from one of the highest risk
countries, his post-entry radicalization points to a more amorphous but
nonetheless serious concern: that some combination of predisposition, lack of
skills (which makes assimilation more difficult), and cultural isolation, could
render some DV recipients as great a risk to the United States as those who
enter with concrete plans to do harm.
The
DV program is also highly susceptible to fraud, as a recent prosecution
demonstrates: on November 6, 2017, the Department of Justice brought charges
against a Somali woman who won the DV lottery and subsequently recruited an
entire fictitious family, including a fake husband and two fake adult children,
all of whom came to the United States, and later naturalized as U.S. citizens
solely on the fraudulent basis that they were related to the Somali woman.[17] All of the fictitious family members
claimed, and naturalized under, alternate identities that were clearly made
possible through the use of fraudulent identification documents. In another
case human traffickers coerced dozens of DV recipients into listing trafficked
young women as their own family members on the DV application.[18]
Because
fraudulent documents used to verify family relationships can be difficult to
spot and are often readily available[19]—particularly
in the developing countries that are likely to be among those eligible for the
DV lottery[20]—the DV program has,
historically, proved particularly difficult to administer. In 2007 the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) described this ongoing concern:
Consular officers at 6 of the 11 posts
we reviewed reported that widespread use of fake documents, such as birth
certificates, marriage certificates, and passports, presented challenges when
verifying the identities of applicants and dependents. Difficulty in verifying
identities has security implications because State’s security checks rely
heavily on name-based databases. In 2003, State’s Inspector General raised
concerns that aliens from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism
can apply for diversity visas. Nearly 9,800 persons from these countries have
obtained permanent residency in the United States through the program. We found
no documented evidence that DV immigrants from these, or other, countries posed
a terrorist or other threat. However, experts familiar with immigration fraud
believe that some individuals, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent
means to enter or remain in the United States.[21]
In
addition to other concerns, the DV program arguably harms some immigrants
themselves, both by exposing DV lottery winners to extortion and fraud,[22] and by permitting lucky lottery
winners to jump the queue ahead of hundreds of thousands of family- and
employment-based applicants, some of whom have been waiting for years, under
other legal immigration programs.[23]
In
light of these apparent flaws, many have called for the elimination of the DV
program, and I am seeking to evaluate its utility and security. To assist in
this endeavor, please respond to the following inquiries no later than December
18, 2017:
1.
Please
describe the internal State Department workflow for DV cases, beginning with
determination of DV-eligible countries, through registration by an applicant
for the lottery, selection, and visa adjudication and issuance.
2.
Evidence
suggests that visa application fraud has been a serious concern, historically,
within the DV applicant population, and fraudulent documents continue to be
available. What technology or process improvements have been made to address
this risk since GAO’s 2007 report and since the recently prosecuted fictitious
family of applicants were approved for DVs in 2001?
3.
I
am concerned that the complexity, burden, and risks may outweigh the rewards of
the DV program. So that we can best assess its true value, please describe the
resources expended on an annual basis to manage and oversee the diversity visa
program, including the lottery registration and selection process and related
web site, and consular adjudication of lottery winners’ applications.
a.
Are
all DV programs costs, including the lottery and registration web site, covered
entirely by applicant fees?
b.
How
does consular processing of DV cases compare with the adjudication of other
immigrant visa applications, in terms of times and resources expended?
i.
If
such metrics are available, what is the average case processing time for the
average DV application? For the average immigrant visa application in other
categories?
ii.
Unlike
most other immigrant visa applicants, DV applicants do not submit a petition
for advance DHS approval,[24] prior to applying for a visa. What, if
any, measures does the Department of State take to compensate for the lack of
DHS scrutiny of DV applicants?
iii.
Unlike
most other immigrant visa applicants, DV applicants must be issued a visa
during the same fiscal year within which they “win” the DV lottery. Are DV
applications expedited or given any other special consideration due to this
restrictive time frame?
iv.
If
statistics are available, please provide the number of DV cases subjected to
administrative processing in the past five years, including the number of such
cases in which a visa was eventually issued.
1.
Please
advise whether, in cases during the last five years where no DV was issued, the
visa was denied, or the application was not successful because the process
could not be completed within the same fiscal year (or for some other reason),
if such information is readily available.
c.
Posts
are required to submit reports of immigrant visas issued and refused, and to
report on “Significant Factors Affecting [Immigrant] Visa Work.”[25] Given that the DV program is
available only in countries with lower numbers of immigrant visa applications,
do embassies and consulates in countries selected for the program see an annual
surge in visa applications due to DV registrants? If so, how is this surge
handled, and what efforts are made to ensure that DV applicant screening is
consistent with screening of other immigrant visa applicants at these lower
volume posts?
4.
Given
significant fraud concerns, has the Department considered employing DNA to
verify family relationships among DV applicants? If you do not use DNA testing,
why not?
5.
Given
the lack of reliable documentation in some developing countries, are DV applicants
refused at a higher rate than applicants from other countries? Can you
calculate the overall refusal rate for DV applicants on an annual basis?
a.
If
such information is available, please provide the DV applicant visa refusal
rate for the past five years and, if readily available, broken down by country
of chargeability.
6.
The
numerous terrorism related prosecutions of former DV applicants raises concerns
for those who implement the program. Is there any mechanism whereby the
Department is notified of the activity of former DV recipients, once they have
arrived in the United States? For example, does the Department of Justice
notify the Department of State when it (DOJ) prosecutes a former visa
recipient—DV or otherwise—and if so, how is that information evaluated and
incorporated into DV (or other visa) program management?
7.
Please
provide any other information that may be helpful as we evaluate the DV
program.
Thank
you in advance for your cooperation with this request. If you have questions,
please contact Katherine Nikas or Brad Watts at (202) 224-5225.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Cc:
The Honorable
Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Senate
Committee on the Judiciary
Ms. Elaine Duke
Acting
Secretary
Department of
Homeland Security
-30-
[1] Ltr. From
Chmn Grassley to Act. Sec’y Duke and Sec’y Tillerson (Nov. 1, 2017) available
at
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-seeks-details-nyc-attacker.
[2] Brooke
Singman,
Six Terror-Linked Foreigners Entered US Via ‘Diversity Lottery,’
Says Trump Administration Fox News, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/11/14/six-terror-linked-foreigners-entered-us-via-diversity-lottery-says-trump-administration.html
[hereinafter Singman,
Six Terror-Linked Foreigners].
[3] U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Press Release (Oct. 27, 2017) available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/uzbek-citizen-sentenced-15-years-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorists.
[4] Singman,
Six
Terror-Linked Foreigners.
[6] CNN,
FBI,
Justice: El Al attack was terrorism (Apr. 12, 2003) available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/04/12/airport.shooting/.
[10] See
generally, U.S. Dept. of State Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), 9 FAM § 502.6
(
Diversity Immigrant Visas).
[11] U.S.
Dept. of State,
Diversity Visa Program Statistics, available at
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/diversity-visa/diversity-visa-program-statistics.html.
[14] See,
e.g., Murdock, Deroy,
Diversity Visa Lottery is a Jackpot for Immigrants
from Terror States, Nat’l Rev. (Nov. 6, 2017) available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/453460/diversity-visa-lottery-public-safety-terrorism.
[17] Dept.
of Justice, Press Release,
Denaturalization Sought Against Four Somalia-Born
Individuals Who Falsely Claimed to be a Family and Were Admitted to the United
States on Diversity Immigrant Visas (Nov. 6, 2017) available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/denaturalization-sought-against-four-somalia-born-individuals-who-falsely-claimed-be-family.
[18] See
Fact Summary: U.S. v. Afolabi, UNODC Human Trafficking Knowledge Portal,
available at
https://www.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/traffickingpersonscrimetype/usa/2010/united_states_v._afolabi.html?lng=en&tmpl=htms;
see also U.S. Attorney District of New Jersey, “Togolese Woman Sentenced
To 27 Years In Prison For Forced Labor,” press
release, September 20, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2010/
Afolabi,%20Akouavi%20Kpade%20Sentencing%20PR.pdf.
The risk of this specific form of fraud has likely been reduced or eliminated
by the subsequently imposed requirement that all DV family members be listed at
the time of lottery registration.
[19] See,
e.g., Zill, Oriana,
Crossing Borders, How Terrorist Use Fake Passports,
Visas, and Other Identity Documents, Public Broadcasting Service (2014),
available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/fake.html;
see also Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Identity and Benefit
Fraud, available at
https://www.ice.gov/identity-benefit-fraud.
[20]
Countries with otherwise low levels of immigration are selected for the DV
lottery. In recent years these countries may tend to be among the least secure,
where other means of emigration, including for skilled employment or higher
education, are less readily available.
See, e.g., Murdock, Deroy,
Diversity
Visa Lottery is a Jackpot for Immigrants from Terror States, Nat’l Rev.
(Nov. 6, 2017) available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/453460/diversity-visa-lottery-public-safety-terrorism;
see also Alvarez, Patricia, The Diversity Visa Program Was Created to
Help Irish Immigrants, The Atlantic (Nov. 1, 2017), available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/diversity-visa-program/544646/
(noting that “Over time, the percentage of these visas allocated to immigrants
from Europe has declined, while the share coming from other
regions—particularly Africa and Asia—has surged”).
[21] GAO
Report 07-1174, , available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1174.
[22] The
Department of State recently warned of “a notable increase in fraudulent emails
and letters” being sent to DV Lottery winners (U.S. Dept. of State, Visa
Services,
Diversity Visa Program Scammers Sending Fraudulent Emails and
Letters available at
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/general/fraud.html)
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services also warned applicants to
“[n]ever send money to anyone who sends you a letter or email claiming you have
won.” (USCIS,
Green Card Through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program,
available at
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/diversity-visa.)
[23] Cong.
Research Serv.,
Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues (Apr. 1, 2011),
p. 9, available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41747.pdf.
[24] This
inquiry is not concerned with DV lottery winners who adjust status from within
the United States.